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Abstract 
 
In light of increasing green house gas emissions and severity of climate change impacts, 
elucidating the psychological barriers that limit climate change mitigation behaviour, especially 
in individuals from industrialised countries with poor mitigation performance, is important. This 
study sought to establish the extent of climate change scepticism and uncertainty in a 
representative sample of Anglophone Canadians, and determine the association with values, 
knowledge and socio-demographic factors. 229 participants responded to a mail invitation to 
take part in the online survey. Scepticism and uncertainty toward climate change were assessed 
using an attitudinal index that yielded a composite scepticism score. Environmental values were 
assessed using a modified version of the New Environmental Paradigm scale (NEP), and 
political association, climate change knowledge and several demographic variables were 
determined using established metrics. A full factor multiple regression analysis showed region, 
NEP score and Conservative Party of Canada association as the significant predictors of 
scepticism. Further regression modelling showed that values and politics explained 31% of the 
variation in scepticism scores, socio-demographic variables 6%, and education and knowledge 
3%. These findings highlight the dominant role of environmental values and political orientation, 
and are discussed in the context of the theory of socially-organised denial of climate change and 
the information-deficit model of climate inaction.  
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1.0 Introduction 
 
The scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change is almost unprecedented (IPCC 
2014), and while the need for urgent and sustained action to mitigate and adapt to this threat is 
widely acknowledged, the global response has thus far has been very inadequate. For instance, 
total emissions of green house gases (GHG) - the major anthropogenic contributor to climate 
change - continue to rise, despite the scientific evidence for and increasing public awareness of 
their role in climate change (IPCC 2007, 2014). 
 
While commitment to and the efficacy of mitigation policies vary significantly between 
nations for various political, economic and ideological reasons, perhaps surprising has been 
Canada’s poor response over the last decade. Canada traditionally perceives itself as an effective 
leader on global affairs and threats, including international environmental issues (Cass 2013), yet 
now finds itself at the bottom of the Climate Change Performance Index for both G8 and OECD 
member countries (30th from 30 in 2014). Indeed, “Canada still shows no intention of moving 
forward with climate policy and therefore remains the worst performer of all industrialised 
countries” (Burck, Marten, and Bals, 2014). Domestic federal policy on GHG emissions has 
remained relatively static across both Liberal and Conservative Party governance (Cass 2013), 
while national (Government of Canada 2014) and global (IPCC 2014) emissions have risen.  
 
With current ‘business as usual’ climate mitigation efforts, global GHG emissions are 
projected to grow over the next several decades, with increasingly negative impacts on human 
health and well-being (IPCC 2014). Given the significant proportion of GHG emissions 
attributable to individual and domestic energy use in developed countries (e.g. Baiocchi et al., 
2010), the severity of climate change impacts is dependent on the extent to which individuals 
choose to engage in mitigation behaviour. 
 
1.1 Individual barriers to mitigation 
 
Several psychological barriers preventing effective individual action have been identified 
(Kollmuss & Agyeman 2002; Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, & Whitmarsh 2007; APA, 2009; 
Gifford 2011). Gifford (2011) identifies approximately 20 specific impediments, categorising 
them within seven psychological constructs: ideologies, limited cognition, investments, 
perceived risk, other people, discredence, and limited behaviour. Common to the various schema 
is the concept of climate change scepticism, which while sometimes used to capture different 
constructs (Capstick and Pidgeon 2014), is understood here as the belief that climate change is 
not occurring or that human activities are not a significant contributor. These beliefs manifest 
themselves along a continuum of varying degrees of uncertainty, through to absolute denial. In 
the context of resource dilemmas, perceived uncertainty reduces pro-environmental behaviour 
and likely promotes action that is more orientated toward self-interest (Hine & Gifford 1996). As 
noted by APA (2009), uncertainty probably functions as a justification for climate change 
inaction or postponed action. In addition to directly influencing inaction, uncertainty and 
scepticism may also impact mitigation intent or behaviour by mediating or interacting with other 
psychological barriers. For instance, uncertainty increases perceived powerlessness about 
environmental problems (Kaplan 2000), which in turn affects pro-environmental intentions and 
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actions (Haller & Hadler 2008) including climate mitigation behaviour (Aitken, Chapman, & 
McClure 2011). 
 
Whitmarsh (2011) examined climate change attitudes and beliefs in the UK, and reported 
that the increasing certainty of climate change in scientific and media messages was at odds with 
the stability of climate change scepticism amongst the public, in approximate agreement with 
data on USA respondents (Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Feinberg, Rosenthal, & Marlon 
2014). Her results showed that ideology and environmental values were much stronger predictors 
of scepticism than was climate change knowledge.  
 
1.2 Study objectives and hypotheses 
 
I used a survey approach to determine base-line measures of attitudes and values regarding 
climate change from a representative sampling of Anglophone Canadians. In particular, I sought 
to assess scepticism, and determine how it may vary with socio-demographic factors, knowledge 
and values. While primarily an exploratory study, I also tested several discrete hypotheses: 
 
(i) Western Canada’s oil sands are the country’s greatest and fastest growing GHG-
emitting sector (Government of Canada 2014). The region enjoys very high economic 
benefit from that industry, with, for instance, $172 billion in wages and salaries projected 
between 2012 and 2035 (Burt, Crawford, & Arcand 2012). These facts may predict a 
more acute conflict between pro-environmental values and wealth aspirations for many 
Western Canadians, and be expressed as greater climate change scepticism as individuals 
attempt to resolve the cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957). Therefore, I hypothesised 
that scepticism would be higher in respondents from Western Canada (H1). 
 
(ii) Political conservatism has previously been associated with greater climate change 
scepticism in other countries (Whitmarsh 2011; Leiserowitz et al. 2014), possibly due to 
the link between support for free-market ideology and lower pro-environmental values 
(Zhou 2013) or environmental apathy (Heath & Gifford 2006). Therefore, I hypothesized 
that higher scepticism scores would associate negatively with pro-environmental values 
(H2) and positively with Conservative Party association (H3). 
  
(iii) Public education on climate change has been limited and controlled in Canada by the 
incumbent government over the last eight years through various political and bureaucratic 
machinations (Cuddy 2010; O’Hara 2010). Indeed, the government has been accused of 
“the construction of ignorance” amongst its citizenry on climate change (Young & 
Coutinho 2013). Therefore, I anticipated climate change knowledge to be relatively low 
in Canada, and hypothesized it would inversely associate with scepticism (H4). 
 
2.0 Method and Materials 
 
2.1 Recruitment 
 
Responses were collected using an online survey that employed the Qualtrics® (Provo, 
Utah, US) platform. In order to obtain as representative sample of the Canadian adult population 
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as possible, invitations to participate were delivered in January 2014 via mail to 13,916 
households using the Canada Post Unaddressed Targeted Delivery Service®. This service selects 
random postal routes within each province/territory, and guarantees deliver to each household 
within the selected routes. Invitations to participate were sent to each province/territory in 
approximate proportion to its population, and included houses, apartments, and farm residences. 
The one-page invitation letter briefly outlined the purpose of the study, and stated that 
individuals needed to be 18 years or older to participate and that completion of the survey would 
enter them into a lottery for a $500 cash prize. Interested individuals were then directed to a 
secure URL address that housed the survey. To access the survey, respondents had to enter a 
unique identifier code provided in each letter. An option to complete a hard-copy version of the 
survey was given for those without Internet access. The study has Brock University Research 
Ethics Board clearance (File # 12-059). 
 
2.2  Demographics  
 
Key demographic characteristics were captured, including age, gender, personal and 
household income, number of children living at home, country of birth, political orientation 
(Which federal political party are you most likely to support?), ethnicity/culture most closely 
identified with, and type of community lived in (city, town, village or hamlet (‘rurality’)). 
Ethnicity response options were those used by Statistics Canada, The Government of Canada 
(http://www5.statcan.gc.ca).  
 
2.3 Scepticism  
 
To determine the most appropriate measure(s) of scepticism to employ, I followed the 
approach of Whitmarsh (2011). Firstly, responses to 23 attitude statements derived from 
Whitmarsh (2008) were collected on a 5-point Likert scale. The order of presentation of 
statements to participants was fully randomised. Factor Analysis (PCA with varimax rotation) 
was then applied to the data using XLStat (version 7.5.2, Addinsoft, 40, rue Damremont, 75018 
Paris, France). As shown in Table 1, three factors are derived from the analysis. Factor 1 
accounts for 26% of the variance in the data set, and cumulatively, the three factors explain 55%. 
Factor 1 is loaded with items that reflect climate change uncertainty and scepticism, in close 
agreement with the findings of Whitmarsh (2011). Therefore, the responses to the 12 statements 
highlight in Factor 1 (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.887) were averaged for each respondent to form this 
measure of scepticism 
 
2.4 Other measures  
 
Participants were asked their highest education qualification attained and highest 
qualification in a ‘science-related subject’, with response categories (Table 2) derived from 
Statistics Canada, The Government of Canada (http://www5.statcan.gc.ca). Self-assessed 
knowledge about climate change was measured with two questions: How much, if anything, 
would you say you know about climate change? (6-point scale ranging from ‘Nothing, have 
never heard of it’ to ‘A lot’) and How well informed do you consider yourself on the issue of 
climate change? (6-point scale ranging from ‘Not informed’ to ‘Very well informed’). Finally, 
environmental values were assessed using the New Environmental Paradigm scale (NEP; 
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Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones 2000), as shortened and adapted by Whitmarsh (2011). The 
six statements used were:  ‘Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to suit their 
needs’, ‘Humans are severely abusing the planet’, ‘Plants and animals have the same rights as 
humans to exist’, ‘Nature is strong enough to cope with the impact of modern industrial nations’, 
‘Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature’, and ‘The balance of nature is very delicate 
and easily upset’, with reverse coding applied to statements 1, 4 and 5.  
 
2.5 Statistical analysis  
 
All procedures were carried out using XLStat. Scepticism scores (mean, 2.26; SD, 0.88) 
were standardised (mean = 0), and investigated using one-way ANOVA, with the various socio-
demographic, knowledge and values factors used as the independent variables. Tukey’s HSD 0.05 
was used as the means separation test. Possible associations were also examined for quantitative 
variables using Pearson’s correlation. Linear regression was used to determine the relative effect 
of socio-demographic, education/ knowledge and values measures on standardised scepticism 
scores.  
 
3.0 Results 
 
3.1 Sample description 
 
229 respondents completed all or most of the survey, representing an overall response rate 
of 1.6%. The sample (data not shown) is broadly representative of the Canadian adult population 
with respect to gender, age, ethnicity, immigration status, mean employee income, mean 
household/family income and rurality (Statistics Canada 2006-2013). With respect to political 
party orientation for the major political parties, the sample aligns closely with a recent poll on 
federal vote intentions (EKOS Research Associates, July 23, 2014). There are two noteworthy 
differences between this sample and the wider Canadian population. Respondents appear to have 
a significantly higher level of education attainment; 52% of this sample report possessing a 
Bachelor’s degree or higher, compared with 22% of the general adult population (Employment 
and Social Development Canada 2012). However, in the latter survey, adults were defined as 15 
years of age or older, which would artificially lower the proportion of Bachelor degree holders in 
comparison to this sample. Secondly, the proportion of respondents from the province of Quebec 
is significantly lower than the wider population. This may be because the survey was only 
offered in English; a majority of Quebec residents report French as the mother tongue (Statistics 
Canada 2011). 
 
3.2 Scepticism 
 
Table 2 shows total agreement for the 12 individual scepticism statements. Highest 
agreement was for The media is often too alarmist about issues like climate change (38% of 
respondents) and Many leading experts still question if human activity is contributing to climate 
change (37%), while the lowest agreement was for I do not believe climate change is a real 
problem (8%). Average agreement across all scepticism statements is 2.3, which falls 
approximately halfway on the scale between disagree a little and neither agree nor disagree. 
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3.3 Socio-demographic factors 
 
The age of respondents was not linearly associated with scepticism scores (r198 =-0.00, 
p=0.99, d.f. = 198), however one-way ANOVA showed a significant effect of age categories 
(F5,197 =2.23, p=0.05). However, scores of participants aged between 40 and 44 yrs were 
significantly higher than for all other age classes (Figure 1 (I)). Scores were not linearly 
associated with personal income (r198=-0.03, p=0.71), and one-way ANOVA of the major 
personal income classes (<$5 000, $5 000-$24 999, $25 000-$49 999, $50 000-$74 999, $75 000 
and over) showed no effect (F4,194=0.31, p=0.87). Scepticism scores did not vary with household 
income when the major income groupings ($0-$19 999, $20 000-$39 999, $40 000-$59 999, $60 
000-$99 999, $100 000-$149 999, $150 000 and over) were analysed (F5,193=0.72, p=0.61), 
although significant differences were observed between the two extreme household income 
groupings (<$30 000 vs. $150 000 and over; t1,68=4.45, p=0.04; Figure 1 (II)). Scores from 
respondents with three or more children in their households were significantly higher than for 
those with two, one or no children (t1,197=3.28, p=0.02; Figure 1 (III)). Respondents whose 
highest qualification was below a Bachelor degree were significantly more sceptical of climate 
change than those with a Bachelor or graduate degree (t1,201=5.13, p=0.03; Figure 1 (IV)).  
 
 By contrast, neither gender (t1,198=1.97, p=0.16), rurality (F2,196=1.59, p=0.21), immigrant 
status (born in Canada vs. immigrated; t1,198=0.00, p=0.96) nor highest science qualification 
attained (F3,195=0.76, p=0.52) associated with scepticism. With consideration to respondent 
location, variation between individual provinces and territories could not be examined due to the 
low number of responses for many cells. However, when the wider geographical regions of 
Western Canada (British Columbia and Alberta) and Central Canada (Ontario and Quebec) were 
compared - which captures the four most populated provinces and 86% of the Canadian 
population (Statistics Canada 2013) - respondents from Western Canada showed significantly 
higher scepticism scores (t1,122=5.83, p=0.02; Figure 1 (V)).  
 
3.4 Climate change knowledge, environmental values, and political orientation 
  
Climate change knowledge was assessed by averaging responses to the questions How 
much, if anything, would you say you know about climate change? and How well informed do 
you consider yourself on the issue of climate change? Answers to these two questions were 
significantly correlated (r199=0.72, p<0.0001). To perform ANOVA, responses were coded as 
low (1-3.5), moderate (4) or high (4.5-6) climate change knowledge; no significant effect was 
found (F2,200=2.43, p=0.09), although a comparison of the high vs. low knowledge groups 
showed significantly higher scepticism scores in the latter (t1,148=4.83, p=0.03; Figure 1 (VI)). 
 
 The average NEP score in this sample was 3.98 ± 0.72. As expected, these scores were 
inversely associated with climate change scepticism (r198=-0.52, p<0.0001), and an analysis of 
the top vs. bottom quartiles showed scepticism was substantially greater for respondents with 
low NEP scores (t1,112=51.01, p<0.0001; Figure 1 (VII)). An ANOVA examining political party 
affiliation (Liberal Party, Conservative Party, New Democratic Party, Green Party, and 
Other/None/Would not vote) showed significantly higher scepticism scores for respondents 
identifying with the Conservative Party of Canada (F4,195=11.00, p<0.0001; Figure 1 (VIII)). 
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3.5 Multivariate and mediation analysis 
 
In order to assess the relative contribution to scepticism from these diverse variables, linear 
regression was used to separately model the socio-demographic, education/knowledge, and 
value/politics factors (Table 3). Several socio-demographic and education/knowledge factors 
become non-significant when environmental values and political orientation were added to the 
model (Model 3), both of which are highly predictive. Interestingly, region becomes significant 
in Model 3, reflective of the lower scepticism of respondents from Central Canada. The full 
model accounts for 35% of the variation in scepticism scores. When the three independent 
variable groups are modelled separately, socio-demographic variables explain 6% of the 
variation, education and knowledge 3%, and values and politics account for 31%, highlighting 
the dominant role of environmental values and political orientation when controlling for other 
variables in predicting climate change scepticism in this sample (Figure 2).  
 
In order to test for mediation, the significant predictors were regressed onto the socio-
demographic and education/knowledge variables (data not shown). Region is associated with 
highest educational qualification, with 66% of Central Canada respondents holding a Bachelors 
degree or higher compared with 41% in other regions. Pro-environmental values are positively 
associated with (female) gender, and inversely associated with number of children (3 or more). 
Conservative Party association is positively linked with (male) gender and number of children (3 
or more), while inversely associated with climate change knowledge. Amongst the mediator 
variables themselves, environmental values are predicted by Conservative Party association (B=-
0.79, β=-0.43, t1,198=-6.67, p<0.0001), but not by region (t1,198=-0.56, p=0.56). NEP scores were 
19% lower for respondents who identified with the Conservative Party compared with all other 
responses (t1,198=44.46, p<0.0001). 
 
3.6 The highly sceptical 
 
As greater opportunities to affect attitudinal and behavioural change may exist amongst the 
more sceptical Canadians, I also examined their socio-demographic, education/knowledge and 
values/politics responses compared to the entire sample in order to best identify and characterise 
these individuals. ‘Highly sceptical’ was defined as a standardised scepticism score of 1 or 
greater.  This corresponded to a mean raw score of 3.8 ± 0.5 for this group (n=34), compared 
with 1.9 ± 0.6 for other respondents (n=166); they were twice as sceptical about climate change. 
Their profile is shown in Figure 3. The highly sceptical were 2.3 times more likely to vote 
Conservative, and over 70% more likely to reside in Western Canada. They also had more 
children in their household and were most likely to be male. As expected, the NEP scores of the 
highly sceptical were (modestly) lower than for the entire sample.   
 
4.0 Discussion 
 
4.1 Hypothesis 1:Regional and international comparisons 
 
Overall, there appears to be a general acknowledgement that climate change is a problem, 
with only 8% agreeing with I do not believe climate change is a real problem. However, 
responses to some of the more nuanced statements are less compelling, with, for instance, only 
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44% of respondents disagreeing with the statement Climate change is just a natural fluctuation 
in earth's temperatures. This suggested discrepancy may be indicative of multiple constructs 
underlying understanding and expression of scepticism by the public (Capstick & Pidgeon 2014). 
Some confidence in the robustness of the composite scale used here, at least with respect to 
capturing ‘epistemic scepticism’ (Capstick & Pidgeon 2014), is its strong agreement with that 
derived by Whitmarsh (2011) with UK respondents; the same 12 statements associated with 
scepticism and uncertainty also loaded on the first factor of her PCA, and also showed good 
internal validity. Also noteworthy in this study are the attitudes loading on Factors 2 and 3, with 
statements in Factor 2 reflective of disinterest and need for information, and Factor 3 broadly 
capturing emotional and moral dimensions of climate change risk perception. 
 
Heath and Gifford (2006) previously surveyed a small sample of Canadians from British 
Columbia, and measured belief that global climate change is occurring. Ecocentrism, 
environmental apathy, and perceived knowledge were identified as the significant predictors, 
with the latter finding in general agreement with the results reported here (Fig 1 (VI)). The 
higher scepticism scores of individuals from Western Canada in the current study may reflect an 
attempt to resolve the cognitive dissonance created between pro-environmental values and 
wealth aspirations or goals, facilitated by the economic dominance of the high GHG-emitting oil 
sands industry in the region, similar to the “socially-organised denial of global warming” in oil-
rich Norway reported by Norgaard (2006). This interpretation is supported by the observation 
that there were no differences between the average NEP scores of Western Canadians and 
respondents from other regions (t1,198=1.84, p=0.18), although it requires further testing.  
 
 The composite scepticism scale used here has not been widely applied in other countries, 
which makes direct comparisons with other populations difficult. However, Whitmarsh (2011), 
using the same index, reported average climate change scepticism scores in the UK public of 2.7 
and 2.9 in 2003 and 2008, respectively, suggesting modestly higher overall scepticism than 
observed in this study, although time frames are obviously different. More recently, the data of 
Leiserowitz et al. (2014) suggest Americans - Canada’s closest neighbours - are significantly 
more sceptical, with, for example, 23% of USA respondents reporting they do not believe global 
warming is happening.  
 
4.2 Hypotheses 2 and 3:Values and politics 
 
Conservative political association was a strong predictor of climate change scepticism in 
this study, in agreement with USA (Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & Leiserowitz 2009) and UK 
(Whitmarsh 2011) findings. This result is likely driven, at least in part, by the lower 
environmental concern of Canadians holding conservative political values, which concurs with 
previous studies (see Zhou, 2013 for a review). Environmental protection - and via extension, 
climate change mitigation – involves government intervention into free markets, which conflicts 
with conservative values (McCright & Dunlap 2011). Similarly, individuals with free-market 
ideology are more likely to believe that ‘the market’ will solve all problems, including 
environmental, and thus are more sceptical about climate change (Heath & Gifford 2006). A 
closer examination of responses shows a significant interaction between political association and 
highest educational qualification attained (F1,196=2.02, p=0.045). While higher educational 
attainment (dichotomised as below Bachelor or above Bachelor degree) associated with lower 
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scepticism for non-Conservatives, Conservative voters with a Bachelor degree or higher (n=15) 
were more sceptical of climate change than those with lower attainment (n=23) (data not shown). 
Caution should be applied because of the low n in these cells. However, the result agrees with 
the report of McCright and Dunlap (2011), although it is not due to lower pro-environmental 
values in the more highly educated Conservatives, as suggested by Zhou (2013); the interaction 
between political orientation and education was not significant for NEP scores (F1,196=0.71, 
p=0.40). Pro-environmental values were the strongest independent predictor of climate change 
scepticism, in agreement with Whitmarsh (2011).  
 
4.3 Hypothesis 4: Climate change knowledge 
 
It is often assumed that a low level of climate change education or understanding is an 
important contributor to scepticism and inaction – the so-called ‘knowledge-deficit model’ 
(Bulkeley 2000) - and therefore policy and other activities are best to focus on public education. 
However, self-reported climate change knowledge did not differ (t1,198= 0.30, P=0.58) between 
the highly sceptical (mean=4.35 ± 1.07, n=34) and other (mean=4.25 ± 1.01, n=166) respondents 
in this study, and only 1.2% of the overall variance in scepticism scores was attributable to 
knowledge of climate change in the regression model. To the extent that climate change 
knowledge is linked to scientific literacy, these findings are consistent with those of Kahan et al. 
(2012), who did not find support for the hypothesis that limited scientific literacy and 
understanding of climate change underlies public apathy and scepticism. Some caution should be 
applied in interpreting our results, however, as objective measures of climate change knowledge, 
such as those used by Tobler et al. (2012), were not obtained here. 
 
These results suggest there may be a relatively low return on interventions focused solely 
or even primarily on climate change education in Canada. A possible exception may be for 
Conservative voters, who report lower overall knowledge of climate change, perhaps reflective 
of the current Conservative government’s substantial efforts to centralize and restrict messaging 
about climate change and its impacts (Young & Coutinho 2013) and/or simple apathy (Heath & 
Gifford 2006).    
 
4.4 Limitations and other considerations 
 
The lower than expected response rate, and thus relatively small sample size, is a 
significant limitation of the study. It reduces confidence in the representativeness of the sample, 
and may have underpowered some analyses. A larger sampling in the future, along with a French 
version of the survey to capture more responses from Quebec, may enable a robust segmentation 
of the Canadian public, similar to the Six Americas initiative on beliefs and attitudes about 
global warming in the USA (Maibach et al. 2009). This may ultimately assist in more targeted 
and effective communications around climate mitigation and adaptation. Non-response bias is 
also an inherent problem in research that seeks a representative sampling of a population’s 
attitudes or behaviour. In this instance, it is possible that Canadians who are the most sceptical 
about climate change are those least likely to complete a survey on climate change perception. 
However, a significant financial incentive for participation in the study was included to try and 
mitigate this risk. 
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 As noted by Whitmarsh (2011), climate sceptics base their beliefs on ideology, rather 
than evidence; a view supported by the primacy of political association and pro-environmental 
values in the current study. Communications strategies based on climate change ‘education’ are 
therefore less likely to be effective in the highly sceptical, as the information will be interpreted 
within the context of their existing values and worldviews, which are difficult to change. Instead, 
climate messaging for this group may be more effective if framed around other issues, such as 
energy independence and security (Whitmarsh 2011). For the less sceptical, communication 
campaigns may be best advised to avoid sensationalism or alarmist approaches, as many 
Canadians already attribute the media with such hyperbole on climate change, and alarmist 
communication may lead to less public engagement and lower motivation for mitigation 
behavior (O’Neil & Nicholson-Cole 2009). Finally, structural interventions that foster pro-
environmental values may be an effective long-term strategy in Canada, although further 
research is needed to elucidate how climate change communication and policy can be tailored 
and optimised, given the diversity of public scepticism and values. 
 
5.0 Conclusions 
 
Scepticism and uncertainty represent potentially powerful barriers to individuals 
undertaking effective action on climate mitigation and adaptation. This pilot study surveyed a 
representative sample of the Canadian Anglophone population to determine their level of climate 
change scepticism and how it associates with socio-demographic, knowledge/education and 
value dimensions. H1 was confirmed: respondents from Western Canada were more sceptical 
about climate change than those from the other regions examined, which may be interpreted as a 
strategy for resolving cognitive dissonance between pro-environmental values and wealth 
aspirations. H2 and H3 were confirmed: scepticism scores were negatively associated with pro-
environmental values, and were higher for respondents with a Conservative Party orientation. 
These two factors were the strongest predictors of climate change scepticism of all measures 
assessed. H4 was partially confirmed. While a full factor regression model failed to identify 
climate change knowledge as a significant predictor, scepticism was modestly higher in low- 
knowledge respondents compared to high- knowledge respondents.  The most highly sceptical of 
all Canadians are male, Conservative Party voters living in Western Canada with a greater 
number of children in their household.  
 
These baseline data should allow changes in climate scepticism in Canada to be tracked 
over time, as well as evaluation of the efficacy of interventions for encouraging climate change 
mitigation behaviours. Overall, these findings highlight the importance of ideology and values in 
shaping beliefs on climate change, and illustrate the heterogeneity of empirical scepticism in a 
population, which in turn may account for different levels of mitigation engagement. This 
suggests that messaging and policy strategies on climate mitigation might need to be 
differentiated and optimised for different segments of the Canadian public.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Factor analysis of attitude statements concerning climate change (CC). 
 Factor 
 1 2 3 
Claims that human activities are changing the climate are exaggerated. 0.708   
CC is just a natural fluctuation in earth’s temperatures. 0.622   
I do not believe CC is a real problem. 0.499  -0.607 
I am uncertain about whether CC is really happening. 0.681   
It is too early to say whether CC is really a problem. 0.718   
The evidence for CC is unreliable. 0.688   
There is too much conflicting evidence about CC to know whether it is actually happening. 0.738   
CC is too complex and uncertain for scientists to make useful forecasts. 0.563   
Too much fuss is made about CC. 0.731   
Floods & heat-waves are not increasing, there is just more reporting of it in the media these days. 0.481  -0.454 
Many leading experts still question if human activity is contributing to CC. 0.652   
The media is often too alarmist about issues like CC. 0.547  -0.446 
Talking about CC is boring.   0.638  
The thought of CC fills me with dread.   0.745 
CC is something that frightens me.   0.760 
I feel a moral duty to do something about CC.   0.696 
Recent floods and heat-waves in this country are due to CC. -0.435  0.643 
The effects of CC are likely to be catastrophic. -0.479  0.590 
I consider CC to be an unacceptable risk.   0.505 
CC is too complicated for me to understand.  0.663  
I often talk about CC to family or friends.  -0.690 0.474 
It is difficult to know which products are better for the environment.  0.472  
I need more information to form a clear opinion about CC. 0.439 0.442  
 
‘Climate change’ rather than the abbreviated ‘CC’ shown here was used for all statements in the survey. The PCA and varimax rotation options 
within XLStat were used. Only items loading with coefficients over 0.4 are shown. Values in bold correspond for each variable to the factor for 
which the squared cosine is the largest. 
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Table 2. Total agreement for scepticism statements. 
 
1 Total agreement is the sum of the “agree a little” and “agree strongly” response options. 2 Average score on 5-point likert-scale (1 = strongly 
disagree; 5 =  strongly agree). 
 
Scepticism statements  
Total 
Agreement1  Mean2 SD 
  (%)     
Claims that human activities are changing the climate are exaggerated. 19.2 2.1 1.3 
Climate change is just a natural fluctuation in earth's temperatures. 30.5 2.7 1.3 
I do not believe climate change is a real problem.   7.5 1.7 1.0 
I am uncertain about whether climate change is really happening. 15.5 2.0 1.2 
It is too early to say whether climate change is really a problem. 11.8 1.9 1.2 
The evidence for climate change is unreliable. 14.6 2.1 1.1 
There is too much conflicting evidence about climate change to know whether it is actually happening. 20.7 2.4 1.3 
Climate change is too complex and uncertain for scientists to make useful forecasts. 25.4 2.5 1.2 
Too much fuss is made about climate change. 18.8 2.1 1.3 
Floods and heat-waves are not increasing, there is just more reporting of it in the media these days. 13.6 2.1 1.1 
Many leading experts still question if human activity is contributing to climate change. 36.6 2.8 1.4 
The media is often too alarmist about issues like climate change. 38.0 2.8 1.4 
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Table 3. Linear regression analysis of climate change (CC) scepticism scores.  
    B SE β t Sig B SE β t Sig B SE β t Sig 
Model #                  
  
Adjusted  
R2 
Predictor Variables                
                   
  
So
cio
-
de
mo
gr
ap
hic
 Constant 1.32 0.37  3.55 *** 1.99 0.53  3.77 *** 3.27 0.58  5.62 *** 1  Gender -0.27 0.15 -0.13 -1.79 NS -0.42 0.16 -0.21 -2.68 ** -0.10 0.14 -0.05 -0.67 NS 
 0.06 Age 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 NS 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.09 NS -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.21 NS 
  Household income 0.00 0.00 -0.09 -1.34 NS 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.99 NS 0.00 0.00 -0.09 -1.46 NS 
  Rurality -0.15 0.09 -0.12 -1.70 NS -0.16 0.09 -0.12 -1.80 NS -0.13 0.08 -0.10 -1.72 NS 
  No. of children -0.73 0.26 -0.19 -2.77 ** -0.74 0.26 -0.19 -2.82 ** -0.26 0.24 -0.07 -1.09 NS 
  Region -0.27 0.14 -0.13 -1.90 NS -0.21 0.14 -0.11 -1.48 NS -0.26 0.13 -0.13 -2.03 * 
  
Ed
uc
ati
on
 &
 
Kn
ow
led
ge
                 
2  Highest educational qual      -0.40 0.17 -0.20 -2.33 * -0.24 0.15 -0.12 -1.58 NS 
 0.11 Science education      0.11 0.08 0.12 1.46 NS 0.09 0.07 0.09 1.31 NS 
  CC knowledge      -0.17 0.07 -0.17 -2.23 * -0.10 0.07 -0.10 -1.5 NS 
                  
  
Va
lue
s &
 
Po
lit
ics
                 3  Environmental Values           -0.57 0.09 -0.41 -6.10 *** 
 0.35 Political orientation           0.52 0.17 0.20 2.99 ** 
                  
 
Model 1 consists of Socio-demographic variables only; Model 2 includes Socio-demographic and Education/Knowledge variables; Model 3 
includes Socio-demographic, Education/Knowledge and Values/Politics variables. Number of children coded as 3 or more vs. less than 3. Region 
coded as Central Canada vs other provinces/territories. Highest educational qualification coded as Bachelor or graduate degree vs. below 
Bachelor degree. Environmental values represented by New Environmental Paradigm scores. Political orientation coded as vote Conservative 
Party of Canada vs. all other responses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
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Figure 1. Influence of selected socio-demographic factors, knowledge and values on climate change scepticism. For each variable (i-
viii), means with different letters are significantly different (Tukey’s HSD 0.05). 
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Figure 2. Proportion of variance in scepticism scores explained by different sets of predictors from linear regression (see text for 
model parameters). 
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Figure 3. Profile of the highly sceptical. Data represent the proportional difference in key measures between respondents with 
standardised scepticism scores of 1 or greater and the total sample. 
 
